{"id":783784,"date":"2026-05-09T07:39:26","date_gmt":"2026-05-09T07:39:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/783784\/"},"modified":"2026-05-09T07:39:26","modified_gmt":"2026-05-09T07:39:26","slug":"economic-fury-disrupts-networks-supplying-weapons-and-uav-components-to-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/783784\/","title":{"rendered":"Economic Fury Disrupts Networks Supplying Weapons and UAV Components to Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>WASHINGTON\u2014<\/strong>Today, as part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted 10 individuals and companies based in several jurisdictions across the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe that are enabling efforts by Iran\u2019s military to secure weapons, as well as raw materials with applications in Iran\u2019s Shahed\u2011series unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missile program.\u00a0OFAC continues to proactively disrupt these networks that seek to support Iran\u2019s acquisition of weapons and materiel.\u00a0 Concurrently, the U.S. Department of State is designating four entities in connection to the conventional arms activities of Iran.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhile the surviving IRGC leaders are trapped like rats in a sinking ship, the Treasury Department is unrelenting in our Economic Fury campaign,\u201d said <strong>Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent<\/strong>. \u00a0\u201cUnder President Trump\u2019s decisive leadership, we will continue to act to Keep America Safe and target foreign individuals and companies providing Iran\u2019s military with weapons for use against U.S. forces.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>ECONOMIC FURY Delivers MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime\u2019s ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds. \u00a0Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0472\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">disrupted<\/a> billions in projected oil revenue, taken actions that have led to the freezing of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.foxbusiness.com\/media\/bessent-says-us-seized-nearly-500m-iranian-crypto-operation-economic-fury-sends-regime-crisis\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">nearly<\/a> half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency, and <a href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0477\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">cracked down<\/a> on Tehran\u2019s shadow banking networks.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Treasury remains ready to take economic action against Iran\u2019s defense industrial base so that Iran cannot reconstitute its production capacity and project power outside its borders.\u00a0 Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/SecScottBessent\/status\/2048859291797336363?s=20\" rel=\"nofollow\">including airlines<\/a>, and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.foxbusiness.com\/politics\/trump-admins-operation-epic-fury-takes-aim-banks-handling-iranian-money\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">foreign financial institutions<\/a> that facilitate Iran\u2019s activities\u2014including those\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0476\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">connected<\/a> to the People\u2019s Republic of China\u2019s independent \u201cteapot\u201d oil refineries.<\/p>\n<p>Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions. Treasury will vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime\u2019s primary revenue stream, and any person or vessel facilitating the illicit flow of oil or other products risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>WEAPONS PROCUREMENT<\/p>\n<p>China-based <strong>Yushita Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd<\/strong> (Yushita) is a facilitator for the Center for Progress and Development of Iran (CDPI)\u2014the latest name of Iran\u2019s U.S.-designated\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/2009-2017.state.gov\/r\/pa\/prs\/ps\/2012\/07\/194924.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation<\/a> (CITC), which coordinates Iranian technology acquisition efforts. \u00a0CITC has sought to purchase weapons, including\u00a0man-portable air-defensive systems (MANPADS), from China.\u00a0 The\u00a0U.S. Department of State designated CITC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2012.\u00a0 Dubai-based<strong> Elite Energy FZCO<\/strong> (Elite Energy) transferred millions of dollars to Hong Kong-based <strong>AE International Trade Co Limited<\/strong>\u00a0(AE International) in furtherance of these procurement efforts for CITC.\u00a0 Hong Kong-based <strong>HK Hesin Industry Co Limited<\/strong> (HK Hesin) and Belarus-based <strong>Armory Alliance LLC<\/strong> (Armory Alliance) acted as intermediaries in these procurements for CITC, in an effort to obfuscate the Iranian end-user. \u00a0Belarus-based Iranian national <strong>Mohammadmahdi Maleki<\/strong> (Maleki), an employee of Armory Alliance, also contributed to these procurements for CITC. \u00a0Belarussian national <strong>Mohammed Ali Tolibov<\/strong> (Tolibov) is the chief executive officer of Armory Alliance and a long-standing arms procurement facilitator for Iran in Belarus.<\/p>\n<p>Yushita, AE International, HK Hesin, Armory Alliance, and Maleki are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, CITC.\u00a0 Elite Energy\u00a0is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, AE International.\u00a0 Tolibov is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Armory Alliance.<\/p>\n<p>Hong Kong-based <strong>Mustad Limited<\/strong>, as an intermediary, has facilitated, or attempted to facilitate, financial transactions in furtherance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\u2019 (IRGC\u2019s) procurement of millions of dollars\u2019 worth of weapons.\u00a0 The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC pursuant to E.O.\u00a013382 in October\u00a02007 in connection with Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program.<\/p>\n<p>Mustad Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC.<\/p>\n<p>UAV AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COMPONENT PROCUREMENT<\/p>\n<p>OFAC today is taking additional action against Iran-based\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/jy1766\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company<\/a> (PESC), building on OFAC\u2019s action from\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0465\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">April 2026<\/a>.\u00a0 PESC has procured thousands of servomotors with one-way attack UAV applications, which have been recovered in downed Shahed-136 UAVs, for Iran\u2019s\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/2017-2021.state.gov\/u-s-announces-new-iran-related-sanctions\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization<\/a> (IRGC<strong>\u00a0<\/strong>ASF\u00a0SSJO).\u00a0 On September\u00a027, 2023, OFAC designated PESC pursuant to E.O. 13382 for\u00a0having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF SSJO. \u00a0The\u00a0U.S. Department of State designated\u00a0the IRGC ASF SSJO, which is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches, pursuant to E.O.\u00a013382 on July 18, 2017 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.<\/p>\n<p>China-based <strong>Hitex Insulation Ningbo Company Limited\u00a0<\/strong>(Hitex) has supplied\u2014or attempted to supply\u2014millions of dollars\u2019 worth of carbon fiber, honeycomb fabric, and other raw aerospace\u2011grade materials to PESC, ultimately for the IRGC ASF SSJO.\u00a0 Chinese national <strong>Li Genping\u00a0<\/strong>is the legal representative of Hitex and manages the company\u2019s sales, purchasing, and financial operations.<\/p>\n<p>Hitex is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PESC.\u00a0 Li Genping is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hitex.<\/p>\n<p>INTENSIFYING PRESIDENT TRUMP\u2019S MAXIMUM PRESSURE CAMPAIGN\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>This action builds on OFAC\u2019s implementation of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/02\/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">National Security Presidential Memorandum 2<\/a>, which directs the U.S. government to apply maximum pressure on Tehran by curtailing Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program, countering its development of asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, preventing it from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and cutting off the IRGC\u2019s access to the assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities.<\/p>\n<p>Today\u2019s action also represents Treasury\u2019s sixth round of nonproliferation designations in support of the September 27, 2025, reimposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions and other restrictions on Iran, which occurred as a direct result of its \u201csignificant non-performance\u201d of its nuclear commitments.<\/p>\n<p>OFAC is taking this action pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters.<\/p>\n<p>SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS<\/p>\n<p>As a result of today\u2019s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.\u00a0 In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.\u00a0 Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC\u2019s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. \u00a0OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. \u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ecfr.gov\/current\/title-31\/subtitle-B\/chapter-V\/part-501\/appendix-Appendix%20A%20to%20Part%20501\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">OFAC\u2019s\u00a0Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines<\/a>\u00a0provide more information regarding OFAC\u2019s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. \u00a0The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.\u00a0 In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. \u00a0OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.<\/p>\n<p>The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC\u2019s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.\u00a0 The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.\u00a0 For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC\u2019s guidance on\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ofac.treasury.gov\/specially-designated-nationals-list-sdn-list\/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ofac.treasury.gov\/recent-actions\/20260508_33\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Click here for more information on the persons designated today<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"text-align-center\">###<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"WASHINGTON\u2014Today, as part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":104906,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[51,50,52],"class_list":{"0":"post-783784","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-news","8":"tag-headlines","9":"tag-news","10":"tag-top-stories"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@us\/116543485750024473","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/783784","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=783784"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/783784\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/104906"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=783784"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=783784"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=783784"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}