{"id":88233,"date":"2025-07-24T09:01:13","date_gmt":"2025-07-24T09:01:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/88233\/"},"modified":"2025-07-24T09:01:13","modified_gmt":"2025-07-24T09:01:13","slug":"the-rbas-dual-mandate-inflation-and-employment-speeches","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/88233\/","title":{"rendered":"The RBA&#8217;s Dual Mandate \u2013 Inflation and Employment | Speeches"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>I\u0092d like to begin by acknowledging the Traditional Custodians of the land on which we meet and pay my<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\trespects to Elders past and present.<\/p>\n<p>It\u0092s an honour to join you today at the Anika Foundation fundraising lunch. The Foundation supports<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tvital work on youth mental health research, awareness and education, in which I have a strong personal<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinterest.<\/p>\n<p>I\u0092m proud to uphold the tradition of the Reserve Bank Governor speaking at this event to support an<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\torganisation that is making a real difference.<\/p>\n<p>My remarks today centre on the dual objectives of monetary policy: \u0091price stability\u0092, which<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmeans maintaining low and stable inflation; and full employment, which I will talk about in more detail<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlater.<\/p>\n<p>I\u0092ll explore how these aims have shaped the Monetary Policy Board\u0092s strategy in recent<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tyears. As<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpart of that, I will reflect on the relationship between the labour market and inflation over that time,<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tand how conditions in the labour market have evolved to the present day.<\/p>\n<p>Now is a good time to revisit these subjects, following the agreement two weeks ago of an updated<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tStatement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, which sets out the common understanding of<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tGovernment and the Board on key elements of the monetary policy framework.<\/p>\n<p>But before I turn to that, I\u0092ll start with an update on recent monetary policy settings.<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\tRecent monetary policy settings<\/p>\n<p>If you cast your mind back to 2022, you will recall that inflation was higher than it had been in decades,<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpeaking at 7.8\u00a0per\u00a0cent at the end of that year. It was this rise in inflation that required a<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttightening in monetary policy over 2022 and 2023, with the cash rate increasing from almost zero to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t4.35\u00a0per\u00a0cent over that period.<\/p>\n<p>Over the past couple of years, we have made meaningful progress in bringing inflation down. Higher<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinterest rates have been working to bring aggregate demand and supply closer towards balance. We expect<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\theadline inflation in the June quarter to be in the lower half of our 2\u20133\u00a0per\u00a0cent target range \u2013 although that partly<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\treflects the ongoing effect of temporary cost-of-living relief. As that effect unwinds, we expect<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\theadline inflation to pick up to around the top of the band at the end of this year and into the first<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpart of 2026.<\/p>\n<p>To help look through temporary factors like this, we also pay close attention to trimmed mean inflation<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t(published quarterly), which provides a good guide to underlying inflation trends. This<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmeasure has also been easing, but it\u0092s still a bit higher than headline inflation. At<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t2.9\u00a0per\u00a0cent in the March quarter, year-ended trimmed mean inflation was under<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t3\u00a0per\u00a0cent for the first time since 2021.<\/p>\n<p>We expect trimmed mean inflation to fall a little further in the June quarter in year-ended terms.<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHowever, the monthly CPI Indicator data, which are volatile, suggest that the fall may not be quite as<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmuch as we forecast back in May. We still think it will show inflation declining slowly<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttowards 2\u00bd\u00a0per\u00a0cent, but we are looking for data to support this expectation.<\/p>\n<p>Encouragingly, as inflation has slowed, the labour market has eased only gradually and the unemployment<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\trate is relatively low. I\u0092ll have more to say on developments in the labour market later.<\/p>\n<p>Since February, we have reduced the cash rate by 50\u00a0basis points. The Board continues to judge that a<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmeasured and gradual approach to monetary policy easing is appropriate. Global economic and policy<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdevelopments have so far been largely in line with our baseline May forecasts, and the likelihood of a<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsevere downside \u0091trade war\u0092 appears to have diminished. But there is still uncertainty and<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunpredictability in the global economy. The Board\u0092s view is that monetary policy is well placed to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\trespond decisively to adverse international developments if needed.<\/p>\n<p>Our longstanding strategy has been to bring inflation back to target while preserving as many of the gains<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin the labour market as possible. This approach meant that interest rates in Australia did not rise as<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\thigh as they did in some other economies, and so we may not need to lower them as much on the way down.\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n<p>We also know that Australians continue to feel cost-of-living pressures, with the average level of prices<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tnow notably higher than it was just a few years ago. That is why we want to make sure that inflation<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tremains low and stable from here on in. Low and stable inflation is good for households, good for jobs,<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tgood for communities and good for the economy.<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\tOur goals of price stability and full employment generally reinforce each other<\/p>\n<p>Stepping back from current policy settings and the inflationary episode of recent years, I now want to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\treflect on the framework that guides the Board\u0092s decisions more generally.<\/p>\n<p>The RBA\u0092s monetary policy objectives are set out in legislation. Our overarching goal is to promote<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe economic prosperity and welfare of the Australian people, both now and into the future. For the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tBoard, this means setting monetary policy in a way that best achieves both price stability and full<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\temployment.<\/p>\n<p>These goals are often referred to as our \u0091dual mandate\u0092 and are longstanding objectives of the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tRBA.<\/p>\n<p>Over time, low and stable inflation and full employment go hand in hand. Low and stable inflation \u2013<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tor price stability \u2013 is a prerequisite for strong and sustainable employment growth because it<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcreates favourable conditions for households and businesses to plan, invest and create jobs without<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\thaving to worry about inflation. So our two objectives are complementary over the longer<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tterm.<\/p>\n<p>Even in the shorter term, the two objectives often go hand in hand. For example, when there are ups and<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdowns in demand, inflation tends to rise as the labour market tightens, and fall as it loosens. So a<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmonetary policy response that returns inflation to target will, in time, also move the labour market<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttowards full employment.<\/p>\n<p>But sometimes there are developments that push up inflation at the same time as they weigh down demand<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\u2013 and therefore employment. This includes sharp increases in energy prices and supply disruptions<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthat push up prices more broadly. As I\u0092ll discuss in a moment, such \u0091negative supply<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tshocks\u0092 were part of the reason for the high inflation of recent years, though they were not the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tonly factor.<\/p>\n<p>In the face of supply shocks that push up prices, we need to think about possible trade-offs: how do we<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbalance our two goals in these circumstances?<\/p>\n<p>If a supply disruption is temporary and modest, monetary policy should mostly \u0091look through\u0092 it.<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tRaising interest rates makes little sense if inflation is expected to ease once temporary supply<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdisruptions are resolved \u2013 it would only weaken the job market.<\/p>\n<p>By contrast, when a supply shock is likely to have a longer lasting effect on the economy and inflation<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthere may be stronger grounds for monetary policy to respond.<\/p>\n<p>A key concern here is that the longer inflation stays high, the more households\u0092 and businesses\u0092<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\texpectations for future inflation could increase. This could, in turn, lead to second-round effects on<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinflation as households and businesses build higher expectations into their decisions.<\/p>\n<p>But if households and businesses instead maintain a high level of confidence that the Board will do what<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tis needed to return inflation to target, inflationary shocks will have less effect on price and wage<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsetting. That means we can look through adverse supply shocks to a greater extent \u2013 even those that<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\twe think could last for some time.<\/p>\n<p>This highlights another important way in which our objectives are complementary \u2013 and it\u0092s<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsomething I want to emphasise. Having a strong track record of low and stable inflation puts us in the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbest possible position to support employment. It means there is less risk of inflation getting out of<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcontrol, which allows inflation to be brought down with smaller increases in interest rates than<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\totherwise. This in turn keeps the labour market closer to full employment.<\/p>\n<p>That is why maintaining well-anchored inflation expectations is a key benefit of inflation targeting<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tframeworks, as I will return to in a moment, and why it is important that inflation returns to be<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsustainably in our target range.\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\tThe dual mandate in the post-pandemic period<\/p>\n<p>So how did this dual mandate shape our policy response to the post-pandemic rise in inflation?<\/p>\n<p>First, the starting point for our monetary policy settings mattered \u2013 these were of course very<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\taccommodative, with the cash rate effectively at zero.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the causes of the pick-up in inflation were crucial. The initial pick-up in inflation was partly<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdriven by some of the supply factors I have mentioned. Temporary disruptions in global supply chains<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tduring the pandemic led to strong increases in goods prices, and the war in Ukraine caused a spike in<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tglobal energy prices.<\/p>\n<p>But it was also clear that demand was part of the story. Accommodative fiscal and monetary policy settings<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin the pandemic period supported strong growth in demand for goods during lockdowns, and this demand<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstrength interacted with supply constraints to amplify inflationary pressures. Then, as lockdowns eased<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tand the economy started to recover, demand for services also recovered strongly. As a result, conditions<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin product markets and labour markets were very tight by mid-2022.<\/p>\n<p>It was clear that we needed to increase interest rates to bring about a better balance between demand and<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsupply, which would help to ease domestic price pressures. This need was reinforced by a concern that<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlonger run inflation expectations could increase. If this happened, it would add to inflationary pressure<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tand would ultimately require a larger policy response, and higher job losses.<\/p>\n<p>Although it was clear that we needed to raise interest rates to slow demand growth, it was less clear how<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tquickly demand pressures needed to ease, how persistent global shocks or their effects would be, and how<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmuch we could afford to \u0091look through\u0092 those effects.<\/p>\n<p>The Board could have chosen to match the more significant rate increases of some other central banks to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbring inflation back to target more quickly. But this could have risked a sharper and more persistent<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tincrease in the unemployment rate.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, the Board judged that a measured approach was consistent with its dual mandate. We increased the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcash rate quickly at first \u2013 but we didn\u0092t go as high as some other central banks. We then<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\theld the cash rate for over a year, even as some other central banks started easing monetary policy.<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tThroughout, we kept a close eye on longer term inflation expectations, to ensure they remained anchored<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tto the target.<\/p>\n<p>This strategy was designed to rein in inflation while also preserving as many of the gains in the labour<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmarket as possible \u2013 an example of our dual mandate in practice.<\/p>\n<p>How has this played out so far?<\/p>\n<p>Since the peak of inflation in 2022, headline inflation has declined by over 5\u00a0percentage points. And<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tover the same period there has been a relatively modest easing in labour market conditions. The<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tunemployment rate has increased from around 3.5\u00a0per\u00a0cent in mid-2022 to 4.2\u00a0per\u00a0cent<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin the June quarter this year, and remains low by historical standards.<\/p>\n<p>Crucially, the share of the population in work has remained around record highs; this is in contrast to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdeclines in many other advanced economies (Graph\u00a01).<\/p>\n<p>Graph 1<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph01.svg\" alt=\"Graph 1: Employment-to-population Ratio - A line graph showing the change in the employment-to-population ratio for Australia, relative to the the 2015-2019 average. A grey band indicates the range of peer economies as a comparison. The chart shows that the employment-to-population ratio has increased more than other peer economies.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>The fact that unemployment has remained low and employment growth has remained strong is remarkable<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\u2013 and very welcome.<\/p>\n<p>And it is striking that the increase in the unemployment rate has been small compared with the large<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdecline in inflation. This is especially true compared with previous episodes of disinflation in<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAustralia (Graph\u00a02).<\/p>\n<p>Graph 2<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph02.svg\" alt=\"Graph 2: Disinflationary Episodes - A two-panel bar graph showing the cumulative change in inflation and the unemployment rate over four disinflationary episodes. The four episodes are 1982-1984, 1990-1992, 2008-2009 and 2022-2024. The top panel shows the decrease in headline inflation in each of these episodes. The bottom panel shows the maximum increase in the unemployment rate during each disinflationary episode. The measures indicate that there has been a smaller increase in the unemployment rate compared to the other episodes.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>Why is this?<\/p>\n<p>Part of the answer is that the supply-driven price increases that I mentioned earlier did turn out to be<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttemporary, even if they flowed through to the economy over a long period of time (Graph\u00a03). As<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthese supply disruptions eventually subsided and oil prices declined, price pressures eased.<\/p>\n<p>Graph 3<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph03.svg\" alt=\"Graph 3: Global Price and Supply Indicators - A two-panel line graph showing global price and supply indicators. The top panel shows the global goods export price growth from 2017 to 2025, and indicates price growth was elevated in 2022. The bottom panel shows global shipping container costs as an index relative to 2017-2019 average. This series shows shipping costs were elevated in 2021 and 2022.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>And also as I mentioned earlier, the Board were very alert to the risk that inflation expectations could<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tincrease. Crucially, that did not happen.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, households and businesses continued to believe that inflation would return to the target range<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t(Graph\u00a04). This limited any so-called \u0091second-round\u0092 effects on inflation, which allowed<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinflation to fall without a sharp rise in the unemployment rate.<\/p>\n<p>Graph 4<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph04.svg\" alt=\"Graph 4: Inflation Expectations and Inflation - A line graph showing headline inflation and trend inflation expectations over time. Inflation expectations have remained  stable since the 1990s, including in the recent history, despite headline inflation rising. In constrast, inflation expectations in the 1980s were more volatile and increased when headline inflation was also high.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>This demonstrates the point I made earlier about how our two objectives can be complementary. A history of<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlow and stable inflation, and the resulting public confidence in the inflation target, enabled the Board<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tto adopt a strategy that protected the labour market as much as possible while still ensuring inflation<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcame down.<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\tHow has the labour market adjusted in the current cycle?<\/p>\n<p>I\u0092ve already highlighted the comparatively modest increase in the unemployment rate over the past few<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tyears from a very low level, and that overall employment has continued growing. The rate of layoffs has<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tincreased only a little and remains at a remarkably low level by historical standards (Graph\u00a05). The<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tshare of workers who are long-term unemployed also remains low.<\/p>\n<p>These are good outcomes \u2013 as job losses are an especially painful way for the labour market to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tadjust to tighter monetary policy. Losing a job can be one of the most stressful events in someone\u0092s<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlife, and it can have far-reaching implications for families and communities.<\/p>\n<p>Graph 5<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph05.svg\" alt=\"Graph 5: Unemployment and Layoffs - A two-panel line graph showing the unemployment rate in the top panel and the layoffs rate in the bottom panel. Both series have increased slightly since the trough in 2022 and remain low by historical standards.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>While the unemployment rate has risen since its trough in late 2022, including an uptick in the month of<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tJune, there has been significant jobs growth in aggregate. Instead, the labour market has adjusted in<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsome other \u2013 less disruptive \u2013 ways.<\/p>\n<p>First, job vacancies have declined from a very high level as firms have slowed hiring activity.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the average number of hours that people are working has declined. This follows a period when hours<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\thad increased sharply due to very strong demand for workers (Graph\u00a06).<\/p>\n<p>Having your hours cut is tough, but it\u0092s often preferable to losing a job altogether. And it\u0092s<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tworth noting that some of this decline in hours has been voluntary, especially over the past year or<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tso.\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n<p>Graph 6<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph06.svg\" alt=\"Graph 6: Average Hours Worked - A line graph showing weekly average hours worked since 2010. The series shows average hours worked increased in 2022 and then fell in 2023 and have remained fairly stable since then.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>Third, there has been a decline in the share of workers voluntarily leaving their jobs (the \u0091quits<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\trate\u0092). This suggests there could be less need for firms to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcompete to attract and retain workers, implying less upward pressure on wages growth than otherwise<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t(Graph\u00a07).<\/p>\n<p>Graph 7<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph07.svg\" alt=\"Graph 7: Wages Growth and Quits Rate - A line graph showing the quits rate and the individual arrangement wages growth since 2003. The chart shows that the quits rate rose in 2022 but has fallen since then to be around its 2015-2019 level. Wages growth has also fallen in the past year.\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>In summary, the gradual easing in labour market conditions has so far been most evident in fewer job<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tvacancies, reductions in hours worked and declining rates of voluntary job switching.<\/p>\n<p>These shifts aren\u0092t without their challenges, but they all tend to be less disruptive than outright<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tjob losses.<\/p>\n<p>I should note that the RBA can\u0092t wave a magic wand and control how adjustments in the labour market<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tplay out. Interest rates are too blunt an instrument for that, and I am not here to claim credit for the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfact that the adjustment has so far taken place in a less costly way.<\/p>\n<p>By the same token, because the labour market can adjust in different ways, we do not \u0091target\u0092<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tany one adjustment mechanism, such as a set number of job losses, as we seek to bring demand and supply<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tback into balance. Indeed, there have been substantial job gains over this period.<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\tAre we close to full employment?<\/p>\n<p>Let me bring the labour market story up to date.<\/p>\n<p>Our overall assessment at the time of our most recent forecast in May was that there was still some<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttightness in the labour market, and we expected it to ease a little over the remainder of this year.<\/p>\n<p>A broad range of indicators underpinned this assessment, and in many ways not much has changed. Firms<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstill report significant difficulties finding labour, even if this constraint has eased somewhat<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\trecently. The ratio of vacancies to unemployed people remains high (Graph\u00a08). At the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsame time, unit labour costs have been increasing strongly.<\/p>\n<p>Graph 8<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.rba.gov.au\/speeches\/2025\/images\/sp-gov-2025-07-24-graph08.svg\" alt=\"Graph 8: Measures of Spare Capacity - A four-panel line graph showing measures of spare capacity. The top-left panel shows the unemployment rate and the hours-based underutilisation rate, which have increased slightly since 2022 but remain low by historical standards. The top-right panel shows the vacancies-to-unemployment ratio which has fallen in the past few years but remains elevated. The bottom-left panel shows the share of firms reporting labour as a significant constraint, which has also fallen in the past few years but remains elevated. The bottom-right panel shows hours worked per capita which has fallen since its recent peak but remains above its long-run average\" width=\"\" height=\"\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>In May we also highlighted the possibility that labour market conditions could be less tight than we<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthought. As I noted earlier, the low rate of job switching may imply less upward pressure on wage growth<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthan otherwise. And the quarterly rate of underlying inflation has recently been around a pace that would<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbe consistent with 2\u00bd\u00a0per\u00a0cent in annual terms.<\/p>\n<p>For that reason, our May forecasts for wages growth and inflation incorporated some downwards judgement to<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\treflect the possibility that there is more capacity in the labour market \u2013 and the economy more<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbroadly \u2013 than is suggested by our usual assessment.<\/p>\n<p>Last week brought us the latest labour market data, which confirmed that the unemployment rate increased<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin the June quarter. Some of the coverage of the latest data suggested this was a shock \u2013 but the<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\toutcome for the June quarter was in line with the forecast we released in May. That<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\ton its own suggests that the labour market moved a little further towards balance, as we were<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tanticipating. While the June monthly data showed a noticeable pick-up in the unemployment rate, other<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmeasures \u2013 such as the vacancy rate \u2013 have been stable recently. More broadly, leading<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tindicators are not pointing to further significant increases in the unemployment rate in the near<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tterm.\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, the risks we highlighted in May remain. As always, there is uncertainty around how labour<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmarket conditions stand relative to full employment, and we will continue to closely monitor incoming<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlabour market data. Our August Statement on Monetary Policy will provide a full updated<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tassessment of labour market conditions and the outlook.<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t\tConcluding remarks<\/p>\n<p>So, to conclude, our goals of low and stable inflation and full employment are closely linked and<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tgenerally reinforce each other.<\/p>\n<p>A critical feature of the recent high-inflation period is that longer term inflation expectations remained<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tanchored. This has enabled the Board\u0092s monetary policy strategy of bringing inflation down in a<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\trelatively gradual way so as to limit the easing in labour market conditions.<\/p>\n<p>Much of the rebalancing of demand and supply in the labour market that has occurred in recent years has<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbeen reflected in declines in job vacancies, hours worked and voluntary job switching. There are many<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tways the labour market can adjust. The RBA doesn\u0092t \u0091target\u0092 a specific outcome, like a<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcertain unemployment rate or number of job losses, to reach full employment.<\/p>\n<p>Monetary policy cannot control how the adjustment happens, but if it can occur while keeping employment<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstrong \u2013 and even growing \u2013 that is a great outcome for workers, families, communities and<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe economy.<\/p>\n<p>In the end, the best way to promote the economic welfare of Australians is by achieving low and stable<br \/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinflation alongside full employment.<\/p>\n<p>And that is what the Board is constantly striving for.<\/p>\n<p>Thank you and I look forward to taking your questions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"I\u0092d like to begin by acknowledging the Traditional Custodians of the land on which we meet and pay&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":88234,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[35],"tags":[210,1141,1142,67,132,68],"class_list":{"0":"post-88233","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-health-care","8":"tag-health","9":"tag-health-care","10":"tag-healthcare","11":"tag-united-states","12":"tag-unitedstates","13":"tag-us"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@us\/114907400438100445","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88233","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=88233"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88233\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/88234"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=88233"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=88233"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=88233"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}