{"id":884109,"date":"2026-06-22T04:24:20","date_gmt":"2026-06-22T04:24:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/884109\/"},"modified":"2026-06-22T04:24:20","modified_gmt":"2026-06-22T04:24:20","slug":"the-persistence-of-israel-first","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/884109\/","title":{"rendered":"The Persistence of Israel First"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Timothy Hopper<\/a> <\/p>\n

( Foreign Policy in Focus <\/a>) \u2013 If there is one conclusion to be drawn from the latest confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel<\/a>, it is the remarkably short life of Donald Trump\u2019s \u201cAmerica First\u201d doctrine. Trump returned to power promising<\/a> to break with Washington\u2019s foreign-policy establishment, avoid costly overseas commitments, and place the interests of American citizens above the demands of allies and foreign governments. For a brief moment, recent tensions involving Iran appeared to support that narrative. Reports of disagreements between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu<\/a>, combined with signals that the White House remained open to diplomacy with Tehran, created the impression that the administration might finally be pursuing a genuinely independent Middle East policy.<\/p>\n

That impression did not last. The sudden hardening of the White House\u2019s tone toward Tehran, followed by the decision to authorize military action against Iran, exposed the limits of Trump\u2019s supposed break with the old order. The strike was more than a military operation; it was a test of whether \u201cAmerica First\u201d could survive a direct collision with Israel\u2019s security priorities.<\/p>\n

The outcome suggested that it could not. More importantly, the episode highlighted a broader pattern that extends far beyond the current crisis. The Iran strike was not an isolated departure from \u201cAmerica First.\u201d It was the latest example of a recurring reality: whenever American and Israeli priorities diverge in the Middle East, Trump\u2019s record consistently shows a preference for the latter.<\/p>\n

The evidence stretches across both Trump administrations. One of the clearest examples was his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was far from perfect, but it imposed significant restrictions on Iran\u2019s nuclear program while avoiding military confrontation. European allies overwhelmingly supported preserving the agreement because they viewed it as a mechanism for regional stability. American intelligence agencies repeatedly indicated that Iran was complying with its core obligations at the time of withdrawal.<\/p>\n

Yet one government had long viewed the agreement as unacceptable regardless of compliance: Israel. Netanyahu devoted years to opposing the deal and publicly pressured Washington to abandon it. Trump ultimately did exactly that. The result was not greater American security but the collapse of diplomatic constraints, heightened regional tensions, and a path that eventually led toward direct military confrontation.<\/p>\n

The same pattern appeared in Trump\u2019s 2017 decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel\u2019s capital and relocate the U.S. embassy. For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations alike avoided such a move because they feared it would inflame regional tensions and undermine Washington\u2019s ability to act as a mediator. The decision delivered a major symbolic and political victory to Israel while generating little measurable strategic benefit for the United States. It weakened America\u2019s diplomatic position across much of the Arab and Muslim world without producing progress toward regional peace.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights in 2019 followed a similar logic. No urgent American national-security interest required the move. The decision did not reduce threats to the U.S. homeland, strengthen the American economy, or improve the lives of American citizens. It did, however, fulfill a longstanding Israeli objective and further aligned U.S. policy with Israeli territorial preferences. Once again, Washington absorbed diplomatic costs while Israel obtained a strategic gain.<\/p>\n

Supporters of Trump often point to the Abraham Accords<\/a> as evidence that his Middle East policy served American interests. The agreements undoubtedly represented a significant diplomatic achievement. Yet even here, the primary strategic beneficiary was Israel. The accords accelerated Israel\u2019s regional integration, expanded its diplomatic recognition, and strengthened its position within the Middle East. The benefits for the United States were more indirect and limited. The accords reduced neither America\u2019s military commitments in the region nor its financial obligations. They primarily reshaped the regional environment in ways favorable to Israel\u2019s long-term strategic objectives.<\/p>\n

The recent strike against Iran fits squarely within this broader pattern. Defenders of the operation argue that it was necessary to restore deterrence<\/a> and protect American credibility. But this explanation raises a fundamental question: deterrence in defense of which interests? The public debate surrounding the operation focused overwhelmingly on protecting Israel, countering threats to Israel, and preserving Israel\u2019s regional security environment. If the principal rationale for military action concerns another country\u2019s security needs rather than direct threats to the American homeland, then the operation becomes difficult to reconcile with the original promise of \u201cAmerica First.\u201d<\/p>\n

At this point, defenders of the traditional U.S.-Israel relationship typically advance a different argument. They contend that the distinction between Israeli interests and American interests is artificial because the two are fundamentally inseparable. According to this view, supporting Israel is itself an expression of American national interest.<\/p>\n

This argument deserves serious consideration. Israel is a longstanding American ally, shares intelligence with Washington, and serves as an important regional partner. Yet acknowledging these realities does not mean that the interests of both countries are always identical. In fact, the history of the Middle East demonstrates numerous instances in which the preferences of Israeli leaders and the broader interests of the United States have diverged.<\/p>\n

The Iraq War offers one example. Although many American officials later concluded that the invasion imposed enormous strategic and financial costs on the United States, influential voices within Israel strongly supported the removal of Saddam Hussein. The war ultimately consumed trillions of dollars, cost thousands of American lives, and contributed to regional instability that Washington continues to confront today. Likewise, policies designed to maximize pressure on Iran have often increased the likelihood of military confrontation, a prospect that many Americans view as undesirable even if it aligns with Israeli security calculations.<\/p>\n

The critical issue, therefore, is not whether Israel benefits from American policy. Allies routinely benefit from one another. The real question is whether Washington retains the capacity to distinguish between policies that primarily advance American interests and those that primarily advance Israeli interests. Recent events suggest that such distinctions have become increasingly difficult within the American political system.<\/p>\n

Indeed, the most striking aspect of Trump\u2019s presidency may be that even a leader who explicitly campaigned against foreign-policy orthodoxies ultimately reinforced one of Washington\u2019s most enduring assumptions: that Israel\u2019s security concerns should occupy a privileged position within American strategic thinking. Trump challenged free-trade agreements, criticized NATO allies, questioned longstanding international commitments, and promised to end endless wars. Yet when it came to Israel, the pattern remained remarkably consistent with the broader bipartisan consensus that preceded him.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Trump and Netanyahu (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead). Public Domain. Via Picryl <\/a>. <\/p>\n

This is why the Iran episode carries significance beyond the immediate military confrontation. It forces a reconsideration of the meaning of \u201cAmerica First\u201d itself. If the doctrine can be suspended whenever Israeli security concerns become central to a crisis, then its practical limitations are far greater than its supporters acknowledged. The issue is not whether Trump supports Israel. Many American presidents have done so. The issue is whether support for Israel has become so deeply embedded within Washington\u2019s political structure that even presidents elected on promises of strategic independence find themselves unable\u2014or unwilling\u2014to depart from it.<\/p>\n

The most important question raised by the recent confrontation is therefore not about Iran. It is about the nature of American power and decision-making. Can American foreign policy in the Middle East be defined independently of Israeli preferences when significant disagreements emerge? Or has support for Israel become such a foundational principle that it overrides alternative conceptions of national interest regardless of who occupies the White House?<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s record provides a revealing answer. From the nuclear deal to Jerusalem, from the Golan Heights to the recent strike on Iran, the pattern is difficult to ignore. The slogan \u201cAmerica First\u201d may have transformed American political rhetoric, but when confronted with the most consequential Middle Eastern decisions, Washington repeatedly returned to a familiar reality. The durability of \u201cIsrael First\u201d has proven far greater than the lifespan of the doctrine that promised to replace it.<\/p>\n

Via Foreign Policy in Focus <\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Timothy Hopper<\/a><\/p>\n

Timothy Hopper\u00a0is an international relations graduate of American University. As a freelance foreign policy writer, his work has been featured on platforms such as intpolicydigest and geopoliticalmonitor.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"By Timothy Hopper ( Foreign Policy in Focus ) \u2013 If there is one conclusion to be drawn…\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":884110,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[2],"tags":[69,83,99,50,11038],"class_list":["post-884109","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-donald-trump","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-news","tag-us-foreign-policy"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@us\/116791862135062031","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/884109","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=884109"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/884109\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/884110"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=884109"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=884109"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=884109"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}