Very good. This is a wise decision after Chinese and US governments demonstrated how they can remotely and retrospectively ban devices in certain counties.
Moreover, the software ideally should be developed locally only (eg no outsourcing) and be published as open source – to avoid vendor lock-ins and hostile actions by foreign admins.
And data should be kept locally only.
People that have never touched a computer in their life are going to decide what’s high risk tech supplier is.
Good idea in theory, probably disastrous in practice.
We’ve already rolled out the red carpet for Palantir though, haven’t we.
Mandelson has links with them, and obviously there are lots of backroom deals and relationships hat we don’t know about.
They have an outsized influence on our government, which is all but confirmed by the contracts they’ve been given for the NHS, Police and Army.
>On August 22, 2026, The Telegraph newspaper reported that Iran-linked adversaries had targeted and forced a small-scale UK energy facility offline for four days.
This implicitly declares critical infrastructure still isn’t air-gapped from the wider public Internet. If you put the controls for you power stations on the same network as North Koreans is it really such a shock that hostile operators will come and with them?
4 comments
Very good. This is a wise decision after Chinese and US governments demonstrated how they can remotely and retrospectively ban devices in certain counties.
Moreover, the software ideally should be developed locally only (eg no outsourcing) and be published as open source – to avoid vendor lock-ins and hostile actions by foreign admins.
And data should be kept locally only.
People that have never touched a computer in their life are going to decide what’s high risk tech supplier is.
Good idea in theory, probably disastrous in practice.
We’ve already rolled out the red carpet for Palantir though, haven’t we.
Mandelson has links with them, and obviously there are lots of backroom deals and relationships hat we don’t know about.
They have an outsized influence on our government, which is all but confirmed by the contracts they’ve been given for the NHS, Police and Army.
>On August 22, 2026, The Telegraph newspaper reported that Iran-linked adversaries had targeted and forced a small-scale UK energy facility offline for four days.
This implicitly declares critical infrastructure still isn’t air-gapped from the wider public Internet. If you put the controls for you power stations on the same network as North Koreans is it really such a shock that hostile operators will come and with them?